St. John's Law Review
Volume 82, Summer 2008, Number 3

Article 6

Idealized Images of Science in Law: The Expert Witness in Trial
Movies
David S. Caudill

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

ARTICLES
IDEALIZED IMAGES OF SCIENCE IN LAW:
THE EXPERT WITNESS IN TRIAL MOVIES
DAVID S. CAUDILLt

I.

APOLOGIA: LAW AND FILM

It is too early to say whether the law-and-cinema discourse
will... succeed in creating modes of analysis that are capable of
withstanding conceptual, empirical, and ethical critique.
Ornamenting our jurisprudential analysis with a reference to
such or such a film or attaching an analysis of a film to a legal
or moral statement of one type or another are liable to ultimately
be but a transient fashion. Yet the conclusion that the discourse
of law and cinema is doomed to be just a fad is equally hasty.1

Scholarly reflection on the portrayal of lawyers and legal
processes in film is a growing practice. As to its status as a subdiscipline of law, it may be identified as Law and Film Studies
("there has been an explosion of study linking law and film from
the late 1980s"2), as part of the law and literature movement 3 (as
t J.D., Ph.D., Professor and Arthur M. Goldberg Family Chair in Law, Villanova
University. This Article is based on a paper delivered on March 24, 2007, at the
annual conference of the Association for the Study of Law, Culture and the
Humanities, held at Georgetown University School of Law. The author gratefully
acknowledges the research assistance of Sean Sansiveri, J.D. candidate, 2008,
Villanova University School of Law.
1 Amnon Reichman, The Production of Law (and Cinema) 45 (bepress Legal
Series, Working Paper No. 1997, 2007), available at http://law.bepress.coml
expresso/eps/1997.
2 STEVE GREENFIELD, GuY OSBORN & PETER ROBSON, FILM AND THE LAW 11
(2001). For a list of works on this topic, see id. at 205-20 (Bibliography).
3 See id. at 11 ("There is a clear link... [between law and film studies and]
work being carried out within the field of law and literature and a number of
parallels can be drawn."). But see Reichman, supra note 1, at 6-7 ("[O]ne is tempted
to describe the relation between [the notion that law and cinema share the medium
of culture and the idea that framework narratives organize law and cinema] as
merely an extension of the relation between law and literature.... Much like in
[the] law-and-literature domain, we... can talk about ... the manner in which law
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in "filmic literature"), as a primary focus of Law and Popular
Culture Studies, 4 or as existing-as do all of the foregoingunder the umbrella of Law, Culture, and the Humanities (as that
sub-discipline is represented by the Association for the Study of
Law, Culture, and the Humanities). 5 The purposes of such
reflection are varied, 6 and include a sense that those in the
discipline of law should pay attention to popular culture. 7 There
is general agreement that the images of law and lawyers in
popular fiction and cinema reflect how people view and
understand legal processes, although there is less agreement
that such images create new views and understandings.8 In any
event, we arguably should know how the general public feels
about law because its members are potential clients or jurors
with whom we will need to communicate, or potential law
students and lawyers who need to have a realistic vision of the
profession, both when deciding whether to study law, or after
they enter law school.
is portrayed in various films. Conversely, we can discuss cinema in law, namely the
manner in which cinema is integrated in legal texts and practices. We can also think
about law as cinema, by referring to legal practices as a specific type of cinematicdramatic practices.... Lastly, we can place law alongside cinema, thereby using the
practices as arenas from which insights can be gained regarding human culture, or
the human condition. Yet [this] should not lead to the erroneous conclusion that
cinema is but a type of text .... Cinema has its own unique features."). Reichman
goes on to argue that cinema is more than narrative due to its "dramatic elements,
among them sound, color and lighting." Id. at 8.
4 See generally RICHARD K. SHERWIN, POPULAR CULTURE AND LAW 1 (2006).
5 See GREENFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 11 ("The entire area [of law and film]
has yet to be defined, and no protocols as to what counts as effective scholarship in
the area have emerged as yet."); see also Reichman, supra note 1, at 16 ("[A]t this
stage the law and cinema discourse is not developed enough to enable us to [decide]
whether to focus on films screened in theaters or whether we should expand the
focus to include related types of media [such as television] as well."); id. at 45
("[L]aw and cinema discourse is still in its infancy ....).
6 Reichman's analysis of law and film constitutes a survey of the various ways
that films can be used in legal training, practice, and scholarship. See generally
Reichman, supra note 1.
7 See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, Law, Lawyers, and Popular Culture, 98
YALE L.J. 1579, 1606 (1989) ("[I]t seems patent that explorations of legal and
popular culture, and the way they interact, should be high on the list of scholarly
priorities.").
8 See, e.g., MICHAEL ASIMOW & SHANNON MADER, LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE:
A COURSE BOOK 7 (2004) ("Popular culture has effects on the people who consume
it ....Most people learn most of what they think they know about law and lawyers
from consuming popular legal culture."); Richard A. Posner, The Depiction of Law in
The Bonfire of the Vanities, 98 YALE L.J. 1653, 1660 (1989) ("Popular fiction is likely
to reflect rather than to influence the popular understanding of law.").
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It is also evident that films about law and lawyers can
sometimes be used as effective teaching tools in law schools,
whether to illustrate good or bad trial advocacy skills, 9 to serve
as hypotheticals for legal education ethics training, 10 or to reflect
on justice and fairness in contemporary or past society (including
issues of gender, race, and power)." However, some argue that
"to confine the use of film within teaching to the merely
pedagogic would be a tragic waste of its full potential."1 2 We
should also be interested in how the portrayal of "internal legal
culture ... affects the external legal culture,"' 3 including the
"'Perry Mason' effect" (jurors expect confessions of guilt during a
criminal trial), the "'People's Court' phenomenon" (jurors find
witnesses credible if judges do not shout skepticism), and the
"'CSI' phenomenon" (jurors expect highly conclusive science in
every criminal case). 14 Films also may offer insights as to "how
law operates in the larger culture."'15 Even when lawyers
sometimes find the representations of law and lawyers in film
unrealistic, the films "tend to be taken as credible
representations of ... reality"' 6 and therefore create a context
with limitations and possibilities for law in society. Finally,
popular cinema can be seen as a jurisprudential activity, offering
insights into contemporary legal philosophy and revealing a
7
"jurisprudence of popular culture."'
On the other hand, some doubt that popular fiction, which
clearly could include popular cinema in the age of electronic mass
9 See Reichman, supra note 1, at 30 ("If the world of cinema can teach us
something about production, it can certainly teach us something about directing,
scriptwriting, and staging." (footnotes omitted)).
10 See id. at 34 ("It has become common place that contract theory,
constitutional judicial review, tort law, and professional ethics-to name but a few
examples-are approached by screening a certain film (in class, before lawyers,
judges, legislators or any other professional audience)." (footnotes omitted)).
Reichman states that "film ... presents a hypothetical story." Id.
11 See id. at 32 ('The idea is to show that the provisions of a certain statute or a
decision of a certain court do not realize their purpose and/or lead to injustice
because they do not take into account certain elements of the reality of human lifeelements about which one can learn through watching films.").
12 GREENFIELD ET AL., supra note 2, at 6.
13 Id. at 5.
14 SHERWIN, supra note 4, at 4.
15 John Denvir, Introduction to LEGAL REELISM: MOVIES AS LEGAL TEXTS xi, xii
(John Denvir ed., 1996).
16 SHERWIN, supra note 4, at 7.
17 See generally WILLIAM P. MAcNEIL, LEX POPULI: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF

POPULAR CULTURE (2007).
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media, is useful for "the permanent and fundamental issues of
law that we call jurisprudence."1 8 Judge Posner concedes that
"we may be able to learn something about the popular
understanding of law from popular fiction about law," but he only
looks to classic works of literature-"the body of writings that are
somehow able to speak to people living under other skies, in
other times, from those of the author and his original audience"for insights about "law at the jurisprudential level." 19 And even
as to great works of literature, Posner doubts that most novels
about law are interesting in any "way that a lawyer might be
able to elucidate":
If I want to know about the system of chancery in nineteenthcentury England I do not go to Bleak House.... There are
better places to learn about law ....[I]n a culture that has
non-literary records, those records generally provide more, and
more accurate, information about the legal system than does
20
literature.
Posner's critique also suggests that great literature has little
to offer legal historians, other than "insight into how law was
perceived by non-lawyers." 21 However, Professor Little argues
that literature can elucidate the atmosphere of a period better
than non-fictional sources can, and therefore offers a
supplementary "way of contextualising legal history and
engaging with particular legal issues."22 Moreover, the effect of
great law-related literature on the public is likely greater than
the effects of legal texts, such that "canonical literature ... is of
crucial significance in terms of shaping the development of the
'2 3
popular imagination of law, and that of lawyers themselves.

Posner, supra note 8, at 1661.
19Id. at 1654-55, 1660-61. Posner mentions Kafka's The Trial, Shakespeare's
The Merchant of Venice, Melville's Billy Budd, and Dickens' Bleak House. See id. at
1654-55.
20 Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature:A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REV.
1351, 1356-57 (1986).
21 Gavin Little, Literature and Legal History: Analysing Methodology, ENT. &
SPORTS L.J., Winter 2005, at 1, 19, http://go.warwick.ac.uk/eslj/issues/volume3/
number2/little (citing Posner, supra note 20).
22 Id. at 32. Little discusses the use of literature as a supplement to "orthodox"
legal history in Holdsworth's Charles Dickens as a Legal Historian, Meron's Henry's
Wars and Shakespeare's Laws: Perspectives on the Law of War in the Later Middle
Ages, and Treitel's Jane Austen and the Law. See id. at 27-34.
23 Id. at 43 (discussing Ian Ward, Literature and the Legal Imagination, 49 N.
IR. LEGAL Q. 167 (1998)).
18
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Finally, when literary depictions are "combined with a range of
non-fictional sources"-such as diaries, autobiographies, and
private papers-they "can be used to build understanding of
socio-cultural attitudes and perceptions, which can then inform
''24
the analysis of specific aspects of social and legal history.
The debate over the utility of literature for legal historians
illuminates several important aspects of the following study of
images of expertise in trial movies. First, I will use trial movies
as an indicator of popular beliefs about expert witnesses. While
"[n]umerous empirical studies have shown that expert evidence
influences jury decisions"-especially when (1) the link between
the research relied upon by the expert and the facts of the case is
clear, and (2) the expertise is presented early in the trialstudies also indicate that jurors likely have trouble
discriminating between good and bad science. 25 This suggests
that other factors are in play when jurors decide which expert to
believe, and just as "[a]n immensely popular contemporary novel
about law may ...afford a better glimpse of how lay people
regard law than a public opinion poll,"26 popular trial movies that
reflect public sentiments may help supplement empirical studies
of how juries evaluate expertise. Second, to the extent that
popular culture, including cinema, shapes the popular
imagination concerning science in law, the representation of
experts in trial movies becomes important for understanding new
developments in the legal context and for framing a response.
Finally, the inter-disciplinary methodology of legal historians24 Id.
at 44 (discussing MARGOT C. FINN, THE CHARACTER OF CREDIT: PERSONAL
DEBT IN ENGLISH CULTURE 1740-1914 (2003)).
25 Edith Greene et al., Jurors and Juries: A Review of the Field, in TAKING

PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 225, 232-33 (James R. P.

Ogloff ed., 2002) (explaining how research "demonstrated that expert testimony
describing studies containing a confound, missing a control group, or having the
potential for experimenter cueing effects is just as influential as valid research").
Long before such studies confirmed juror confusion about scientific issues, there
were "calls ... for the elimination of the jury. Charles H. Dana argued as early as
1853 that 'in a process that had become highly professionalized, it was incongruous
to entrust the evaluation of the experts' arguments on technical points to
uninformed laymen.'" Julie Johnson-McGrath, Witness for the Prosecution: Science
Versus Crime in Twentieth-Century America, 22 LEGAL STUD. F. 183, 188 (1998)
(quoting William E. Nelson, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth
Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 181 (1964)). Moreover, "[t]he legal and medical journals of
the first half of the [twentieth] century are filled with lamentations of juries' refusal
to acknowledge scientific circumstantial evidence." Id. at 191-92.
26 Posner, supra note 8, at 1655.
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who seek a broader understanding of culture to illuminate legal
culture-is implicated in this study, which considers popular
views of science and scientists in its analysis of trial movies.
That is, popular conceptions of lawyers and legal processes
combine with presuppositions about science in public responses
to cinematic representations of expertise.
In Part II of this study, I acknowledge the existing discourse
concerning the reputations of lawyers in films about law and of
scientists in science-fiction films, and introduce the thesis that
the representation of science and scientists in trial movies is
consistent with the idealized image of science that persists in
law. In Part III, I identify the study of the images of science in
"lawyer movies" as a point of intersection between science-andliterature studies (or science and popular culture studies), which
includes the analysis of images of science and scientists in
science-fiction films, and the law-and-literature movement (or
law and popular culture studies), which includes the study of
images of law and lawyers in cinema. 27 The parallel between
those two sub-disciplines of law and science is striking, such that
a hybrid enterprise-the study of scientists in lawyer movies-is
relatively easy to construct on the basis of existing theoretical
frameworks and research. In Part IV, I use examples from
recent trial movies to show that the image of the biased, boughtand-paid-for expert, as well as the image of the expert as the
stabilizer of the contested context of a trial, both reflect the
idealization of science in law. Lawyer movies often deliver a
message that when science is appropriately disinterested and
untainted by advocacy and rhetoric, it will solve the legal
controversies concerning science that are brought on by advocacy
and rhetoric in the courtroom. There are exceptions to these
images, however, such that a third category of films can be
identified in which science is represented more modestly.
Finally, I conclude not only that most cinematic representations
reflect the idealization of science in law generally, but also that
there are adverse consequences for litigation involving experts.
Another point of intersection, not relevant to the present study, is the study
images of law in science fiction-for example, see Colloquy, Galactic
27

of

Jurisprudence,3 L. CULTURE & HUMAN. 357 (2007) (including studies of law in Star
Trek, Blade Runner, The Matrix, and Isaac Asimov's robot novels), and the essays on
law in Star Trek that appear in Star Trek Visions of Law and Justice. See generally
STAR TREK VISIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE (Robert H. Chaires & Bradley Stewart
Chilton eds., 2003).
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II.

REPUTATIONAL CONTOURS IN TRIAL MOVIES

Within the last two decades, lawyers have gone over the cliff as
far as public esteem for the profession is concerned. Legal
popular culture reflects this dismal phenomenon quite
presenting most lawyers in a strongly negative
accurately,
28
manner.
U.S. adults who consume popular culture frequently (habitual
viewers) are more likely than infrequent viewers to hold negative
opinions about science, to believe that science is dangerous,[and]
29
to consider scientists odd and peculiarpeople ....
Given that lawyers have such a bad reputation in popular
culture, and that scientists are contemporaneously viewed as
strange if not dangerous, it would seem that the combination of
these two professions in a trial movie-e.g., a lawyer presenting
the testimony of a scientific expert-would be a public relations
disaster for both law and science. Of course, the negative image
of lawyers could hardly get worse, and their teaming up with
scientists is not likely to help their public reputation for trying to
win at any cost, for manipulating the system and the truth, and
for corruption. 30 It is more likely that their procurement and use
of expert witnesses would be viewed as just another questionable
tactic. As to scientists, as portrayed in science-fiction movies,
their traditional popular culture image as arrogant, godless,
inhuman, mad, dangerous, impersonal, and amoral 31 would seem
28 Michael Asimow, Bad Lawyers in the Movies, 24 NOVA L. REV. 533, 582
(2000); see also LEO J. SHAPIRO & ASsOCS., AM. BAR ASS'N, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF
LAWYERS: CONSUMER RESEARCH FINDINGS 7 (2002) ("The American public says that
lawyers are greedy; lawyers are manipulative; lawyers are corrupt; and that the
legal profession does a poor job of policing itself.").
29 David A. Kirby, The New Eugenics in Cinema: Genetic Determinism and Gene
Therapy in Gattaca, 27 SCI. FICTION STUD. 193, 208 (2000), available at
http://www.depauw.edu/sfs/essays/gattaca.htm (citing George Gerbner, Science on
Television: How It Affects Public Conceptions, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Spring 1987,
109-15).
30 See SHAPIRO & ASSOCS., AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 28, at 7-9 (noting that
seventy-four percent of survey participants agree that lawyers are more interested
in winning than justice, that lawyers "are believed to manipulate both the system
and the truth," and that some say lawyers' tactics "border on the unethical, and even
illegal").
31 See generally ROSLYNN D. HAYNES, FROM FAUST TO STRANGELOVE:
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE SCIENTIST IN WESTERN LITERATURE (1994). Many of the
literary works discussed have been made into movies. See also Walter Hirsch, The
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likely to accompany them when slumming in the cinematic
courtroom-but again, how much worse could their reputation
become? Oddly, however, science and scientists do not seem to
suffer reputational losses in trial movies. This phenomenon can
best be explained by the twin, oscillating images of scientific
experts in law: (1) when the expert is negatively portrayed, it is
often because lawyers and the legal process have tainted science;
and (2) when the expert is positively portrayed, it is often
because science is represented as better than law-a curative to
Both images
law's rhetorical and institutional instabilities.
reflect the shift in popular culture toward more positive images
of science, which corresponds to the growing cultural authority of
Both images, however, also reflect the actual
science.
idealization of science in law, and both images immunize the
scientist from reputational harm. Put simply, cinematic lawyers
continue to look bad, but scientists fare quite well when they
team up with lawyers in trial movies.
By the term "idealization" of science in law, I refer to the
expectation that science is a stable body of relatively objective
knowledge on which the law can draw to settle legal
controversies. 32 That expectation may seem benign, except that
Image of the Scientist in Science Fiction: A Content Analysis, 63 AM. J. Soc. 506, 506,
509 (1958) (presenting an early empirical study of science fiction stories published
between 1926 and 1950). Hirsch found that "scientists occupy the most frequent
occupational category of villain," but scientists were even more often the hero. Id. at
509. In the latter years of the period 1926-1950, however, scientists were "no longer
either supermen or stereotyped villains but real human beings. .. who recognize[d]
that science alone is an inadequate guide," thereby indicating that the post-war
public did not "view science as the obvious means for the solution of social
problems." Id. at 511-12. Andrew Tudor similarly found alternating images of the
scientist as dangerous to and as a savior of society in horror movies produced
between 1951 and 1964, but in more recent horror films, found that the scientist is
unable to eliminate threats to humanity. See ANDREW TUDOR, MONSTERS AND MAD
SCIENTISTS: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE HORROR MOVIE 141-57 (1989).

Historically, this can be explained in part by advances in forensic science:
Throughout the twentieth century, politicians, prosecutors, and forensic
scientists sought to ensure juries' appreciation of and belief in scientific
evidence through a widespread public relations campaign ....The
campaign was carried out through magazine articles, World's Fair exhibits,
short stories, books, and Hollywood movies: the propaganda had supporters
ranging from Harvard University and Erle Stanley Gardner to local police
departments eager to convince taxpayers of the need to fund a municipal or
state forensics lab. The message was simple: disinterested, "objective"
science was the best weapon against crime.
Johnson-McGrath, supra note 25, at 192. In "the construction of science's cultural
authority as pure, unbiased, and objective," the "forensic scientist's testimony is
32
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it often corresponds to a romantic notion of the scientific
enterprise and thereby eclipses not only the instabilities and
controversies within science itself, but also the social and
We see the
rhetorical aspects of even the best science.
idealization of science in law whenever there is a presumption
that if two scientific experts disagree, one of them must be a
This presumption ignores the theoretical
"junk scientist."
presuppositions and limitations of data that lead to genuine
scientific disputes. We also see the idealization of science in law
whenever we associate "bias, interest, and motivation" with
This association misses the practical
unreliable expertise.
advances made by scientists who have strong theoretical biases,
institutional interests, and financial motivations. Finally, we see
the idealization of science in law whenever a legislator,
administrator, or judge demands certainty from science, not
recognizing its probabilistic nature and dynamic history. It is
neither a critique of scientific progress nor an exaggeration to
acknowledge scientific debates, the conventional aspects of
scientific methodology, the importance of networking and "social
capital" with respect to publications and grants, and the
persuasive elements in scientific discourse. To think that these
features are somehow markers of bad science is to idealize
science.
In our recent study of post-Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc.3 3 admissibility opinions, entitled No Magic
Wand: The Idealization of Science in Law, Professor Lewis LaRue
and I identified two different conceptions of the scientific
enterprise among the federal judiciary. 34 The first, a romantic
view, was associated with those trial judges who expected more
from science than can reasonably be delivered. We argued that
such judges tend to make two types of errors: (1) these judges
somtimes ruled too strictly, and disallowed good science because
the expert witness did not live up to their idealistic image of
science;3 5 and (2) these judges sometimes were, paradoxically, too
lenient, and allowed bad science on the basis of its social
unaffected by his or her own background, beliefs, and social and intellectual biases."
Id. at 193.
33 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In Daubert, the Court set new standards for
admissibility of expert opinions in federal courts. See id. at 597.
34 See DAVID S. CAUDILL & LEWIS H. LARUE, No MAGIC WAND: THE
IDEALIZATION OF SCIENCE IN LAW xiv-xv (2006).
35 See id. at 15-28.
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authority alone. 36 Examples of the first error include cases in
which the testimony of a scientist was not admitted because it
was based on less than perfect or incomplete information, or
because it involved alternative explanations or a probabilistic
conclusion. Examples of the second error include cases in which
testimony of a scientist was admitted solely because the expert
had impressive credentials, notwithstanding an unreliable
In both cases, judicial failure to understand the
opinion.
practical goals and limitations of science resulted in admissibility
decisions that were out of sync with the realities of scientific
practice and explanation. We also identified, however, a modest,
non-idealized vision of science among some members of the
federal judiciary. Such judges tended to recognize that science is
a cultural enterprise, with its own controversies, that relies not
only on logic and methodology but also on social conventions,
rhetorical moves, and institutional credentializing. And such
judges were not surprised by experts who disagreed with each
other, by credentialed experts with weak methodologies, or by
qualified scientists who were not willing to testify with absolute
certainty.3 7 We concluded that judges who hold a more modest
view of science tended to make better admissibility decisions.
The present study is not concerned with the judiciary, but
with the public and potential jurors in our adversary system.
Nevertheless, judges, most of whom are not scientists, seem to be
on the side of the general public and share in the public
understandings of science in our culture.3 8 To the extent that
cinema about law reflects public understandings, both the
idealization of science in popular culture and the more modest
views of science in popular culture represent the same
perspectives that were identified in judicial opinions involving
expert admissibility decisions. While the focus of this Article is
on trial movies as the producer of images of scientists in their
interactions with legal processes, an idealized image of science in
popular culture can have effects both on judges and juries who
are called upon to evaluate scientific expertise in the courtroom.
Moreover, the lawyers who present expert testimony, and their
clients, will have to deal with the effects of popular-culture
36

See id. at 31-44.

37 See id. at xv-xvi.
38 See David S. Caudill, Ibsen's An Enemy of the People and the Public
Understandingof Science in Law, 16 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 10-15 (2003).
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images of science and scientists. The significance, therefore, of
trial movies far exceeds their entertainment value.
III. PARALLEL ENTERPRISES
Scientific theses[, "the scientist advised the lawyer,"] can only be
fought with facts or scientific induction. If you'd... [armed
yourself] from the inexhaustible arsenal of paleontological,
zoological, embryological, and physiological facts, you couldn't
all arguments
have helped but win. There one finds weapons for
39
and tastes, to fit the most contradictorytheories.
Those who study the images of law and lawyers in popular
culture have a lot in common with those who study cultural
images of science and scientists. Both enterprises are worrisome,
since the images they identify over the last several decades are
overwhelmingly negative. At least lawyers enjoyed a golden age
in cinema in the decades prior to 1970, wherein the
"prototypical ... lawyer was skillful, devoted to his clients, and
ethical."40 "But negative lawyer portraits began to appear in the
a great many
1970s.... During the [80s and 90s],
rude, crass,
....
been
have
screen
attorneys on the big
41
incompetent."
or
disloyal,
unethical,
selfish,... greedy[,] ...
Scientists, on the other hand, have most often been portrayed
through cinematic history as frightening, from the "Nazi-like
scientists creating 'supermen' through scientific manipulation" in
Man Made Monster42 and The Boogie Man Will Get You, 43 to the
science-bashing 1997 film, Gattaca,44 which warns of a
discriminatory "world dominated by genes." 45 Because lawyers
39 Santiago Ram6n y Cajal, The Natural Man and the Artificial Man, in
VACATION STORIES: FIVE SCIENCE FICTION TALES 169, 183 (Laura Otis trans., 2001)
[hereinafter VACATION STORIES]. Cajal (1852-1934) was a successful scientist and

artist who won the 1906 Nobel Prize for medicine. See Laura Otis, Introduction to
VACATION STORIES, supra, at vii, vii.

Asimow, supra note 28, at 575.
Id. at 576-77.
MAN MADE MONSTER (Universal Pictures 1941).
43 THE BOOGIE MAN WILL GET YOU (Columbia Pictures 1942).
44 GA'TACA (Columbia Pictures 1997).
45 See Kirby, supra note 29, at 198. Kirby notes that the geneticist in Gattaca
who can engineer "the qualities that society finds desirable" is different from the
earlier Doctor "Moreau stereotype, since here the figure of the scientist, rather than
tyrannically enforcing his vision, merely plays upon existing popular beliefs and
attitudes." Id. at 200; see also TUDOR, supra note 31, at 20 (explaining that "mad
scientists" appear as antagonists in horror movies more often than zombies,
40
41
42
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and scientists were both the subject of negative portrayals in
film, both professions could worry about the impact of public
misconceptions.
Indeed, Michael Asimow "speculates that
negative filmed images can lead public opinion as well as follow
it," therefore "such portrayals are [not only] an important social
datum" reflecting the public's law esteem of lawyers, but "they
[also] have real world consequences." 46 In a similar fashion,
Theodore Roszak urges scientists to "face up to the warning" in
the persistent folklore of "Dr. Faustus, Dr. Frankenstein, Dr.
Moreau, Dr. Jekyll, Dr. Cyclops, Dr. Caligari, Dr. Strangelove"for in "these images of our popular culture resides a legitimate
public fear of the scientist's stripped-down depersonalized
'47
conception of knowledge.
Both professions likewise worry about the career effects of
negative popular culture images. Michael Asimow points out
that the public demonization of the legal profession "lowers self
esteem" of law students, "causes lawyers to devalue the work
they do," leads to "career dissatisfaction and stress," and
contributes to distrust of lawyers on the part of clients and
jurors. 48 Scientists are similarly concerned that negative film
depictions have made viewers "feel that a career in science is
undesirable," and even that "decreasing federal funding of the
sciences is due in some part to negative portrayals in popularculture sources." 49 Moreover, it does not seem to matter, with
respect to the cultural power of negative images, that those
images are unrealistic. Even if
law professors, lawyers, law students, film theorists,
or... filmmakers ....are apt to discount the strongly negative
portrayals
of
lawyers ...because
[such
images]
contradict[ ... their own experience ....[or because] the films
[are] poorly written, implausible, or just absurd....
...[T]he

relevant

introspective

community

[consists

ofl] ... people who have only fragmentary, mostly erroneous,
knowledge of what... lawyers

are like

and what

they

werewolves, and mummies combined).
46 Asimow, supra note 28, at 535.
47 Theodore Roszak, The Monster and the Titan: Science, Knowledge, and
Gnosis, DAEDALUS, Summer 1974, at 17, 31.
48
49

Asimow, supra note 28, at 541-42.
Kirby, supra note 29, at 208.
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do ....These are people who are prepared to accept radically
negative statements about law and lawyers ....50
Likewise, because "much of the public's exposure to science is
through fictional representations,"' 51 movie
audiences make judgments about what is "plausible" within the
film's diegesis, not necessarily [about] what is "real."... [I]n
the end ...."a picture is not only worth a thousand words;
be worth a wealth of documented
however inaccurate, it may
'52
evidence to the contrary.
Just as those who have limited contact with law and lawyers are
taught, through fictional films or television, "what lawyers do,
what kind of people they are,... and how the legal system

actually functions,"' 53 science fiction can go beyond "a genre of
fiction per se, and become instead a mode of awareness about the
54
world."
This is not to say that the problem with lawyer movies and
science-fiction films, respectively for the legal profession or for
scientists, is that they are not accurate in their legal-procedural
or scientific theoretical aspects. James R. Elkins, for example,
bristles at the notion that lawyer movies should be viewed as
"failed documentaries," or that we should demand that they "be
legally realistic about law and lawyers before they can be
taken seriously." 55 Likewise, John Denvir sees public and
pedagogical value in lawyer movies, as their "very
quantity... demonstrates... the human appetite for justice"50 Asimow, supra note 28, at 553.
51 Kirby, supra note 29, at 200.
52 David A. Kirby, Science Advisors, Representation, and Hollywood Films, 3
MOLECULAR INTERVENTIONS 54, 56 (2003) (quoting Kevin Padian, The Case of the
Bat-Winged Pterosaur: Typological Taxonomy and the Influence of Pictorial
Representationon Scientific Perception, in 2 DINOSAURS PAST AND PRESENT 65, 65-

81 (Sylvia J. Czerkas & Everett C. Olson eds., 1987)).
53 Asimow, supra note 28, at 552; see also id. at 553 n.102 (arguing that the
background details about law, in a clearly fictional story, can be accepted as truthful
representations).
54 David Banash, Book Review, 30 SCI. FICTION STUD. 123, 124 (2003), available
at http://www.depauw.edu/sfs/birs/bir89.htm (quoting Elisabeth Kraus & Carolin
Auer, Introduction to SIMULACRUM AMERICA: THE USA AND THE POPULAR MEDIA 5
(Elisabeth Kraus & Carolin Auer eds., 2000) (citing Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr., The
SFof Theory: Baudrillardand Haraway,in SIMULACRUM AMERICA)).
65 James R. Elkins, The Legal Mind and the Lawyer Film, PICTURING
JUSTICE: ON-LINE J. L. & POPULAR CULTURE, http://www.usfca.edu/pj/mytake.htm

(recommending that law students remember that a film tells a story, that stories
introduce us to conflict and resolution, that we care for character, and that a film is
an education).
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notwithstanding their lack of "verisimilitude," the artistic license
taken, and oversimplification of "messy reality in their pursuit of
a clear battle between good ... and evil." 56 While a focus on
procedural inaccuracies in a lawyer movie may have some limited
use in a law school evidence classroom, the exercise does not
begin to exhaust the significance of lawyer movies for the public
relations problem of the legal profession. The same is true of
movies about science and scientists, which are frequently
followed by "The Real Science of [books and articles] in which a
57
scientist critiques the 'scientific accuracy' of a fictional film."
For example, Mark Glassy's The Biology of Science Fiction
Cinema summarizes seventy-five films and "systematically
provides an overview of the plot, of what science worked and
what did not, and of what science in the film could actually
happen."58 David Kirby observes that science fiction
scholars will question whether such intense scrutiny of
scientific accuracy is a worthwhile exercise. Obviously, the
science in ...The Ape Man (1943) will be out of date when
compared to the current state of scientific knowledge .... Such

extensive analysis of scientific verisimilitude does not add
anything to our comprehension of ...the cultural significance of
these films ....or American attitudes toward science .... In

the end, the only audience well served by this book is biology
59
teachers who use science fiction films.., as a teaching aid.
On the other hand, "the role that fictional films can play in
the formation of consensus and closure in scientific disputes" 60 is
worthy of attention: "Film not only has the ability to act as a
virtual witnessing technology, but also forces consensus on the
public by presenting a single vision of nature in a perceptually
realistic structure."6 1 Thus, it is not the fact that film directors
exercise license and cut corners to develop a plot-line that
worries scientists, but rather that the public is persuaded to
56 John Denvir, What Movies Teach Law Students, PICTURING JUSTICE.: ON-

LINE J. L. & POPULAR CULTURE, Aug. 25, 2003, http://www.usfca.edu/pj/
teachdenvir.htm ("[T]he typical lawyer movie highlights the human desire for a
'just' result with little interest in procedural niceties .....
57 Kirby, supra note 52, at 58.
58 David A. Kirby, New Studies in Science Fiction Cinema, 30 Sci. FICTION
STUD. 134, 135 (2003) (reviewing MARK C. GLASSY, THE BIOLOGY OF SCIENCE
FICTION CINEMA (2001)).
59 Id. at 135-36.
60 Kirby, supra note 52,
61 Id. at 55.

at 59.
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accept contested representations as settled. Likewise, lawyers
are worried that even though most lawyers are "decent, socially
responsible people who work hard for their clients, successfully
check government overreaching, . . . are pretty ethical most of the
time, and do not earn inordinate amounts of money,"' 62 lawyer
movie audiences experience negative portrayals of the legal
profession as real.
Amidst all this worry, there are some positive signs and
activist efforts with respect to the public perception of lawyers
and scientists. In response to its consumer research on negative
public perceptions of lawyers generally, the A.B.A. Section on
Litigation has proposed that bar associations do three things:
(1) do more to educate consumers about law and lawyers, (2) do
more to educate lawyers about maintaining good client
relationships, and (3) become more active in disciplining lawyers
and in encouraging pro bono work. 63 Michael Asimow observes
that television-as opposed to film-creates more favorable
opinions of law and lawyers, and concludes that "[i]t seems likely
that the negative impact of film on the public perception of
lawyers is more than cancelled out by the positive portrayals of
lawyers on television." 64
There are, of course, numerous
examples of lawyer movies that represent the legal profession in
a positive light; somewhere over one-third of lawyer movies in
the last several decades are categorized as "positive" in Asimow's
65
survey.
On the scientific side of cinema, there is even more optimism
and activism concerning positive portrayals of scientists. In the
past, Hollywood "chew[ed] scientists up and spit them out" as
arrogant, aloof, creators of monsters:
Then along comes Jodie Foster in Contact, playing an
impassioned... astronomer trying to get in touch with her
inner extraterrestrial. Or Sean Connery, in Medicine Man,
playing a crusading botanist trying to cure cancer and save
tropical forests.

62 Asimow, supra note 28, at 540 (footnote omitted).

63 See SHAPIRO & ASSOcS., AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 28, at 37-38.
64 Asimow, supra note 28, at 558.
65 See id. at 568-69 (presenting a survey of eighty-one "lawyer" films from 1990
to 1999, and forty films from 1980 to 1989).
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[And] Russell Crowe [in A Beautiful Mind] as John Nash, a

cranky

and

crazed,

but

curiously

empathetic,

mathematician....

...

[E]ach movie showed the scientist in a positive light-as

an impassioned seeker of truth .... 66
Spielberg's War of the Worlds67 and Minority Report68 similarly
"portray science in a positive light-they portray science as the
answer to ...

disaster problems.

'69

The use of science advisors,

notwithstanding the risk that an advisor might promote his or
her own view in the case of disputed science, makes
contemporary science-fiction films more realistic-"science
advisors

can

utilize

fictional

films

to ...

disseminate

their

public." 70

concepts among the general
And "popularization is
akin to promotion, especially with regard to obtaining funding or
71
other support for scientific research":
The more realistically things are portrayed, the better it is for
everyone-producers and public alike.... The fact that the
movie [Deep Impact] made an effort to portray [the threat of
comet impacts] realistically helps convey [the message that the
72
threat can be mitigated] and raise awareness of a real issue.
The so-called "War Games effect," named after the 1983 MGM
film, refers to the capacity of a realistic fictional film to raise
public awareness and increase research funding. 73 All things
considered, there seems to have been a shift in popular culture
toward a much more positive view of science and scientists.
The parallel to the "War Games effect" in television
programs about law-the so-called "CSI effect" 74-is
not as
66

David Tenebaum, Science Movies: Always Science Fiction?, THE WHY FILES,

Jan. 11, 2002, http://whyfiles.org/147sci-in-film].
67 WAR OF THE WORLDS (Paramount Pictures 2005).
68 MINORITY REPORT (Cruise/Wagner Productions 2002).

69 David Kirby, Hollywood Disaster Movies Can Be a Great Vehicle for Science,
TIMES (London), June 30, 2005, at 12.
70 Kirby, supra note 52; see also id. at 55 ("[T]he advisor's version of 'scientific
fact' may not represent majority opinion ....
[and may] exclude competing
versions.").
71 Id. at 56-57.
72 Id. at 57 (quoting Joshua Colwell, who consulted on the film Deep Impact,
which warned of comet and asteroid impacts).
73 Id.

74 See Richard Willing, 'CSI Effect' Has Juries Wanting More Evidence, USA
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encouraging. Jurors, having watched forensic scientists (in the
various CSI episodes) flawlessly solve crimes in highly
sophisticated laboratories, come to expect that level of
Strangely, the
evidentiary proof in criminal trials.7 5
popularization and lofty expectations of forensic science comes at
a time when the reliability of most of the forensic sciences are
being questioned by legal scholars. 76 Nevertheless, it seems that
science is held in high esteem, and that lawyers and their real
experts will tend to disappoint the public by not living up to an
idealized view of science.
In the next section, I discuss how lawyer movies involving
scientific experts tend to support an idealistic view of science,
whether by representing science as the extra-legal solution to
contested courtroom disputes, or by representing attorneys as
manipulators of weak or greedy experts in order to win lawsuits.
I concede that some trial movies concerning experts, which I
identify and discuss, do not seem to fall into those two
categories-a more modest image of science is sometimes
evident. My analysis confirms, nevertheless, the notion that
scientists seem to be overcoming the public relations problems
created in decades of negative portrayals in science fiction
cinema, while lawyers continue to look bad.

TODAY, Aug. 5, 2004, at 1A (stating that forensic science is presented as fact and

infallible).
75 See Paul Rincon, CSI Shows Give 'Unrealistic View,' BBC NEWS, Feb. 21,
2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/4284335.stm (explaining how CSI offers
perception of near-infallibility of forensic science). This phenomenon is not new. See,
e.g., THOMAS LEITCH, PERRY MASON 53 (2005) (arguing that the popularity of the
"Perry Mason" television series tended to make potential jurors expect a confession,
and to be critical of prosecutors who could not produce one). But see Valerie P. Hans
et al., Science in the Jury Box: Jurors' Views and Understandingof Mitochondrial
DNA Evidence 4 (Cornell Law Sch., Working Paper No. 07-121, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1025582 ("Empirical study of the
CSI effect is in its infancy and the results are mixed.... [One study] found that
undergraduate students who watched CSI were more critical of forensic evidence
than their nonviewer colleagues.... [Another study] found no significant
relationship between viewing CSI and treatment of forensic evidence.").
76 See generally Jane Campbell Moriarty & Michael J. Saks, Forensic Science:
Grand Goals, Tragic Flaws, and Judicial Gatekeeping, 44 JUDGES' J. 16 (2005)
(exploring the failure of some forensic sciences to meet reliability standards, the
revelation of erroneous forensic science through DNA technology, and increasing
questions about the quality of forensic science).
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EXPERTS IN THE MOVIES

Tainted Science: The Expert as Advocate
Despite their ubiquity, experts continue to generate concerns for
the judicialsystem. Doubts have been voiced about overly biased
experts, inaccurate conclusions, misleading testimony, jury
incomprehension, and the fear that scientific expert testimony
may possess an "auraof infallibility. 77

In two relatively recent movies, A Time to Kil 78 and A Few
Good Men, 79 trial experts are characterized as biased advocates,
bought and paid for by lawyers and their clients. Both of the
opposing experts in A Time to Kill are called upon to opine as to
the temporary sanity of the defendant, Carl Lee Hailey, who is
charged with murdering two accused rapists of Hailey's young
daughter on the steps inside the courthouse. The prosecutor and
the defense attorney each present a psychologist, and each
lawyer tries to discredit the other's expert. The science in the
case is presented to the viewers as debatable-this is not a movie
about the clarity or credibility of psychological evaluations of
sanity. That is, there is no direct idealization of science, because
science is not an element of the plot. Rather, the idealization of
science is indirect, insofar as the clear message is that expertise
in the courtroom can be purchased from experienced witnesses.
The implication is that such witnesses will not be concerned
about real science, which could actually help in the search for
truth, but only with saying what they are paid to say. The
prosecution's expert, Dr. Rodenheaver, holds a university chair in
psychiatry and directs a facility for the criminally insane. He
looks distinguished, with a polished and confident demeanor, but
in his many years as a courtroom expert he has never found a
defendant insane, including one housed in his own care for over
ten years. The expert for the defense, Dr. Bass, impliedly also
highly-credentialed, is an overweight, sloppily-dressed alcoholic,
but otherwise seems pleasant, professional, and trustworthy.
Bass testifies that even the insane can premeditate a crime,

77Id. at 23 (citing DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE, EXPERT EVIDENCE § 10.2, at 334 (2004)).
78 A TIME TO KILL (Warner Bros. 1996).
79 A FEW GOOD MEN (Columbia Pictures 1992).
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which is the opinion for which he was hired. Instead of attacking
his testimony as unreliable, the prosecutor discredits the witness
by revealing Dr. Bass's conviction at the age of twenty-three for
statutory rape of a seventeen-year-old he eventually married.
Neither expert ends up looking good (although Dr. Bass is not as
bad as Dr. Rodenheaver), but it is their role as advocates, and not
their background in science, that brings them down. Indeed,
they have impliedly abandoned their credible profession as a
condition for their utility in the courtroom.
A Time to Kill highlights the unfortunate process of
acquisition of scientific knowledge for law-each side hires an
expert to help each side's lawyer advocate a legal position in a
controversy. The problem of filtering science through the needs
of a client is likewise illustrated in A Few Good Men, where a
single expert helps to cover up the scandalous death of a soldier
(with an undiagnosed heart condition) following a hazing ritual.
Dr. Stone, an experienced physician and Chief of Internal
Medicine at a hospital, is portrayed as an obedient colleague of
the military officers involved in the cover-up.
Dr. Stone's
credentials, appearance, and bearing are stellar, but his
testimony is easily discredited because he knows that his
opinion-that the murdered soldier died of poisoning-is untrue.
He abandons medical science, which is never an object of scorn in
the film, to become a liar.
While the lawyer's role in finding an expert willing to
support that lawyer's arguments is quite conventional, it is
arguably a "negative" aspect in terms of public perception.
Viewers of the films just discussed are likely not versed in the
professional ethics of lawyers, and may not know that lawyers
are ethically permitted to present doubtful or shaky expertise (as
long as it is not known to be false).8 0 Significantly, however,
these films are not an indictment of science or scientists
generally. Some scientists, the audience learns, are willing to
become biased advocates, but science as a discipline abhors
fraud; so it is scientists' association with law and lawyers that
taints their scientific profession.
80 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2007); id. R. 3.3 cmt. 8.
Lawyers do not vouch for their experts; lawyers are permitted to do the best they
can to serve their clients in the circumstances. See STEVEN LUBET, EXPERT
TESTIMONY: A GUIDE FOR EXPERT WITNESSES AND THE LAWYERS WHO EXAMINE
THEM 171-72 (1998).
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Another example of expert as a biased advocate appeared
nearly fifty years ago in Anatomy of a Murder.81 Dr. Raschid, the
medical examiner testifying for the prosecution, appears to have
only made examinations that would help the prosecutor, to the
exclusion of others that might help the defendant.
The
contemporary fascination with forensic science, represented by
the popularity of the various CSI television programs, mirrors
the public trust in forensic science in the mid-twentieth century:
An exhibit on the scientific virtues of the medical examiner
system.., at the 1933 Century of Progress Fair in
Chicago... [explained that a medical examiner was] "a nonpolitical official, expert in medicolegal pathology, who conducts
a scientific investigation into the cause of death, whose
work is
'82
purely medical [and whose findings are] impartial.
Notwithstanding such idealizations, some medical examiners
may give in to the influence of unethical prosecutors, as in
Anatomy of a Murder.
Likewise, the figure of Dr. Towler in The Verdict confirms
the image of the expert as advocate.8 3 Prior to his testimony for
the defense in a medical malpractice suit, Dr. Towler is coached
by a roomful of lawyers from the large law firm representing the
defendant hospital. While this is a conventional practice, viewers
would likely get the impression that the witness is being taught
how to respond to cross-examination to avoid telling the truth.
Indeed, the doctor is portrayed as both naive and honest until he
is trained by defense counsel.
In all of these films, science is not an object of disdain-it is
fraudulent science, in the service of advocates, that is the target.
These films are complimented by another type of film that
glamorizes science as a perennial producer of stable knowledge to
bring closure to legal conflicts.

81

ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Carlyle Productions 1959).

Johnson-McGrath, supra note 25, at 192 (quoting Century of Progress
Records, World's Exposition 1933-1934, University Library, University of Illinois at
Chicago).
83 THE VERDICT (20th Century Fox 1982).
82
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Idealized Science: The Expert as Savior
Science is mechanical, technical, value-free, and nonhumanistic.
Science pronounces the law as supplied by nature. Law seeks
justice... [and] is dialectical, idealistic, nontechnical, value84
laden and humanistic.

If scientists can avoid the temptation to become advocatesthereby avoiding accusations of bias, interest, and motivationthey can maintain an image of objectivity even in the contested
world of lawyers. Some lawyer movies promote this image of
expertise, including Erin Brockovich, Primal Fear, Presumed
Innocent, and even the comedy My Cousin Vinny.
In the true story of Erin Brockovich, the heroic file clerk
working for a plaintiffs lawyer discovers a cover-up of industrial
poisoning of a city's water supply.8 5 In the midst of a moving
drama portraying the stress upon working single mothers, the
devastating damage caused by the poisoning, the arrogance of
defense counsel, and the oblivious plaintiffs attorney for whom
Erin works, the image of expertise can be easily missed.
However, Erin meets with a professor who offers scientific
information that confirms the cover-up; the professor even calls
her later with more information, and she is able to help win the
largest settlement ever paid in a direct-action lawsuit. As an
image of science in law, this one is pristine-the professor is not
even dealing with a lawyer, and he does not appear in court or
even get paid; he's completely untainted. He is neither slick nor
polished, but rather a modestly dressed professor who holds the
determinative scientific knowledge to bring justice in the wake of
a tragedy.
Primal Fear is the story of a teenager, charged with the
murder of a Chicago archbishop, who is represented by an
unlikable defense attorney.8 6 Dr. Weil, a medical examiner, is
able to establish that a left-handed person, like the defendant,
inflicted the wounds on the victim. Weil's clear and simple
explanation leads the audience to the truth. Even though
judicial reservations have been expressed concerning the
reliability of "science for litigation"-i.e., testimony based on
84 Howard T. Markey, Jurisprudenceor "Juriscience'?,25 WM. & MARY L. REV.
525, 527 (1984) (warning that science should not displace law).
85 ERIN BROCKOVICH (Jersey Films 2000).
86 PRIMAL FEAR (Paramount Pictures 1986).
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research done after a lawsuit has been filed-resulting in a
preference for untainted pre-trial research as the basis for
courtroom expertise, forensic scientists have somehow escaped
this condemnation.8 7 When Daubert was remanded to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Judge Kozinski
supplemented the U.S. Supreme Court's "factors" to consider in
admissibility decisions with the statement:
One very significant fact to be considered is whether the
experts are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally
and directly out of research they have conducted independent of
the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions
expressly for purposes of testifying .... [W]e may not ignore the
fact that a scientist's normal workplace
is the lab or the field,
88
not the courtroom or the lawyer's office.
As this standard would cast doubt on forensic scientists,
including medical examiners, Judge Kozinski immediately drops
a footnote:
There are, of course, exceptions. Fingerprint analysis, voice
recognition, DNA fingerprinting and a variety of other scientific
endeavors closely tied to law enforcement may indeed have the
courtroom as a principal theatre of operations. As to such
disciplines, the fact that the expert has developed an expertise
principally for purposes of litigation will obviously not be a
89
substantial consideration.
The exception for forensic science is likely, however, unjustified,
given that "[m]any of the forensic techniques used in courtroom
proceedings, such as hair analysis, fingerprinting, the polygraph,
and ballistics, rest on a foundation of very weak science, and
virtually no rigorous research to strengthen this foundation is
being done." 90 Thus, the infallibility that is often attributed to
forensic science in popular culture is illusory and best explained
by the public's idealization of science in law.

s7 See Gary Edmond, Supersizing Daubert: Science for Litigation and Its
Implications for Legal Practice and Scientific Research, 52 VILL. L. REV. 857, 857,

863-65 (2007).
88 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).
89 Id. at 1317 n.5 (citation omitted).
90 D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, A House with No Foundation:
Forensic Science Needs to Build a Base of Rigorous Research to Establish Its
Reliability, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH., Fall 2003, at 35, 35.
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Presumed Innocent is also a murder mystery involving a
prosecutor who is accused of killing his lover, also a prosecutor. 91
A fingerprint specialist is able to establish a match between the
defendant's print and a print on a bar glass found at the crime
scene. Even though there is some doubt because the glass cannot
be produced at trial, the fingerprint evidence is presented as
conclusive. Evidence scholars, it bears noting, have become
increasingly critical of latent fingerprint identification-it does
not have a tradition "of disinterested self-testing," 92 the
"verification process [conducted by law enforcement officials] is
'vulnerable to unconscious bias or deliberate malfeasance' by
examiners, ' 93 and "[a]ppropriate measures of error rates for
fingerprint examiners do not exist."94
Indeed, fingerprint
analysts provide the clearest example of the strategy in forensic
science-"a growing body of unreliable research funded by law
enforcement agencies with a strong interest in promoting the
validity of' 95 their techniques-of placing its claims beyond the
realm of empirical research:
[Fingerprint examiners claim] that their technique has a
"methodological error rate" of zero and that any errors that
occur are therefore lapses on the part of individual examiners.
Because the technique can never be performed except through
the subjective judgment of human fingerprint examiners, it is
impossible to test the claimed division of responsibility for
error
96
empirically. The claim is thereby rendered unfalsifiable.
Yet courts and the public often continue to view fingerprint
analysis as conclusive, due in part to the history and progress of
forensic science in the early twentieth century:
Forensic scientists ... [presented] their opinion as to the truth
that evidence tells. By invoking science's cultural authority and
alleged objectivity, scientists sought to transubstantiate opinion
into fact. To do so, they had to ignore or deny that this truth
91 PRESUMED INNOCENT (Mirage 1990).

92 Recent Case, 115 HARv. L. REV. 2349, 2349 (2002) (criticizing United States
v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001), for upholding the reliability of latent

fingerprinting expertise). "[Flingerprint
application of the Daubert factors .... " Id.

expert

testimony

does

not

survive

93 Id. at 2352 (quoting SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF
FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 269 (2001)).

94 Id. (citing Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA
Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13, 59 (2001)).
95 Risinger & Saks, supra note 90.
96 Id. at 37.
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was inevitably filtered and shaped
by professional experience,
97
interests, and personal biases.
Even though forensic science "differs significantly from what
most of us consider science to be," 98 there "has been a carefully
fostered public perception of near-infallibility." 99 While research
can undermine that perception, cinema can strengthen it.
Finally, My Cousin Vinny highlights the decisive role of
technical knowledge in establishing the innocence of codefendants in a murder trial. 100 The story involves the legal
victory of an inexperienced lawyer over the experienced
prosecutor, 10 1 which parallels the scientific victory-over the
prosecutor's tire mark expert-of the defense attorney's fianc6,
Mona Lisa Vito, an unemployed hairdresser who used to work as
a mechanic in her father's automobile repair shop. She is
unfazed by trick questions on the witness stand, and thereby
rises above the world of advocacy into the realm of scientific
certainty. The stabilizing force of technical knowledge thereby
settles the rhetorical instability of the trial.
These films reflect an idealized image of science in the
courtroom, which is consistent not only with public perceptions of
expertise but also with the identifiable idealization of science by
many judges. 10 2 Indeed, all of the films discussed above, whether
representing experts tainted by law or experts who rise above
law to provide determinable knowledge, rely upon an idealized
view of science as significantly different from and better than
law. Another category of films, however, reflects a more modest
view of science as a human and cultural enterprise.

97 Johnson-McGrath, supra note 25, at 193 (providing the 1934 trial of Bruno
Hauptmann for kidnapping and murdering the "Lindbergh baby" as an example of
the triumph of forensic science).
98 Risinger & Saks, supra note 90.
99 Id. at 36.
100 MY COUSIN VINNY (Palo Vista Productions 1992).
101This motif, with roots in jokes about the wisdom of rural individuals over the
arrogant city-slicker, is also evident in Legally Blonde, where a law student prevails
over experienced opposing counsel, and in Erin Brockovich, where a file clerk
prevails over a large law firm. LEGALLY BLONDE (Marc Platt Productions 2001); see
THOMAS J. HARRIS, COURTROOM'S FINEST HOUR IN AMERICAN CINEMA 102 (1987)
("[T]he 'classic' elements of courtroom drama [include] the humble country lawyer
versus the city slicker, with the former defeating the latter by virtue of his essential

honesty ...

").

See generally CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 34 (arguing, in a study of
judicial images of expertise, that many judges idealize science).
102
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C. A Measured Assessment: The Expert as Human
Some lawyer movies offer relatively positive images of trial
experts, while at the same time acknowledging the pragmatic
limitations of the scientific enterprise. For example, in Suspect,
a homeless individual is falsely accused of murder, and the
10 3
prosecutor calls two witnesses in an attempt to prove his case.
The first, a forensic pathologist, is represented as professional
and competent, but is a bit uncomfortable when challenged. On
cross examination, it becomes clear that his testimony concerning
whether the murder weapon, a knife, belonged to the defendant
was inconclusive, and the expert overlooked the fact that the
defendant was left-handed (he had testified that the knife wound
indicated a right-handed killer). The second expert, a police
detective, testified on the basis of his experience that homicides
are usually committed by the most obvious suspect.
The
detective is also represented as confident and competent, but on
cross-examination the defense attorney rebuts his testimony by
revealing past discoveries of falsely accused individuals on death
row. Viewers of the film are, perhaps unwittingly, introduced to
the persistent problem of "over-claiming" by experts (and "overvaluing" by jurors) in the presentations of expertise. Because
evidence of guilt (or liability in civil cases) is often inconclusive,
some experts exaggerate and express "a confidence not
10 4
warranted by the evidence."
Although the experts in Suspect are ultimately shown to
have exaggerated, such that their testimony is not represented as
decisive truth, they are not portrayed negatively as bought-andpaid-for advocates.
Rather, the experts in Suspect are
characterized as doing the best they can with inconclusive data,
limited resources, and human frailties. The difference between
these experts and biased witnesses who will say anything to
serve a client is subtle, but in Suspect it is the reasonable
limitations of science, rather than the dishonesty of experts, that
are represented as problematic.
That distinction is clearer in the comedy My Cousin Vinny,
where the forensic expert for the prosecution is portrayed as
almost neutral-with eighteen years of F.B.I. experience, he
Delphi Premier Productions 1987).
Samuel R. Gross & Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Information and Expert
Evidence: A Preliminary Taxonomy, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 141, 144 (2003).
103 SUSPECT (ML
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appears to be a professional doing his job, not a recruited
advocate. His confident delivery, based on carefully-collected
crime scene samples and technically-advanced analysis, is
compelling. He is, however, wrong, which the outsider-expert,
Mona Lisa Vito, is able to demonstrate with her superior street
10 5
knowledge.
Two other films, I Am Sam10 6 and Agnes of God, 10 7 highlight
the human side of science. In I Am Sam, the court-appointed
psychologist is represented as biased against Sam, a mentally
challenged father trying to get custody of his young daughter.
The science is almost beside the point, as the psychologist's
confident testimony is obviously weakened by her preconception
of Sam as an unfit parent. When the psychologist is confronted
with her own history-that her son died from an overdose-she
bursts into tears. Interestingly, any message in the film about
the unreliability of expertise is eclipsed by a message about the
source of unjustified prejudice in our society. The expert's bias is
not due to intentional scientific fraud or unethical lawyering,
both of which might support an idealized image of science when it
is methodologically sound and untainted by lawyers. Rather,
occasional bias is represented as unconscious, unfortunate, and
unavoidable in science because it is a human enterprise.
Agnes of God, similarly, also involves an expert with
preconceived notions, this time involving a novice nun accused of
manslaughter in the death of her baby. The expert is determined
to see the accused put in prison, but her anti-Catholicism is due
to her sister's death in a convent. Throughout the film, she
softens and changes her mind about the culpability of the
accused. Like I Am Sam, Agnes of God illustrates the instability
of expertise, although in both films the expert begins with a
personal bias that is overcome. (In neither film, however, does

105 There is an analogy here with recent research into public understanding of
science. We should not assume "that local understandings [of non-scientists] are
inadequate or deficient in comparison to formal, scientific understandings. On the

contrary, they may well represent a more robust and well-tested body of advice,
information, and practical assistance than any new or externally generated piece of
technical evidence." Alan Irwin, Alison Dale & Denis Smith, Science and Hell's
Kitchen: The Local Understanding of Hazard Issues, in MISUNDERSTANDING
SCIENCE?: THE PUBLIC RECONSTRUCTION OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 47, 55 (Alan
Irwin & Brian Wynne eds., 1996).
106 1 AM SAM (Avery Pix 2001).
107 AGNES OF GOD (Columbia Pictures 1985).
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the expertise improve-it just goes away.) My categorization of I
Am Sam and Agnes of God as representing a modest view of
expertise is based on the manner in which these films neither
glamorize nor critique science. Even if "science in the long run
gets most things right," the
sources of error ... are numerous:

[T]he small size of many

studies, for instance, often leads to mistakes, as does the fact
that emerging disciplines, which lately abound, may employ
standards and methods that are still evolving. Finally, there is
bias, which [can be considered] ubiquitous. Bias can take the
form of a broadly held but dubious assumption, a partisan
position in a

longstanding

debate... or ... a belief in

a

hypothesis that can blind a scientist to evidence contradicting
it.10 8
The latter type of error-blinding belief in a hypothesis-is
illustrated by the experts in I Am Sam and Agnes of God. While
the experts are clearly portrayed negatively, the indictment is
personal to them, thereby tempering any idealization of science
but not rejecting their fields of expertise.
Another example of a modest view of expertise is in the film
Music Box, a story of a Hungarian immigrant represented by his
daughter when he is arrested for Nazi wartime atrocities. 10 9 The
expert for the prosecution, a senior forensic document examiner,
uses scientific techniques to authenticate a photograph. He is
challenged, however, for his potential bias as a Jew, but his
testimony turns out to be accurate despite his desire to see the
defendant convicted. The implication is that all experts have
biases, but that such biases do not necessarily signal bad science.
Music Box thereby illustrates that a modest view of the scientific
enterprise is neither a critique nor a skeptical view of science.
Finally, in the film Primal Fear, a psychologist for the
defendant attempts to demonstrate that the accused is mentally
ill. The defendant, however, lies and puts on a show to help the
psychologist, which results in a faulty evaluation. While there is
nothing wrong with the science or the scientist, the "outside"
influence of the defendant renders the expertise useless. The
representation of science in Primal Feartherefore rounds out the
108 David Dobbs, Trial and Error: The Scientific-PublishingSystem Does Little
to Prevent Scientific Fraud. Is There a Better Way?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006,
(Magazine), at 18.
109 MUSIC BOX (Carolco Pictures 1989).
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modest view of expertise in the courtroom. Science is not, by
virtue of its methodological conventions and cultural authority,
flawless. Sometimes there is external interference, sometimes a
scientist has an unconscious bias, and sometimes there is fraud;
but even at its best, science is a cultural activity with limited
data, measurement technologies, and resources, such that
genuine debates and uncertainties are inevitable.
Such films can be contrasted with the films discussed in the
first two categories-bought-and-paid-for experts and those who
deliver extra-legal truth-because science is not idealized. The
modest or nonromantic view of expertise nevertheless represents
a positive and realistic assessment of the scientific enterprise. If
the only problem with courtroom expertise was that some experts
are frauds, and that otherwise, experts rise above the rhetorical
fray to produce determinable knowledge, then the idealization of
science would be justified. But the field of possibilities for
science in law is not thereby exhausted; realistically, even the
best science is often as contested, rhetorical, and unstable as the
legal context into which it is delivered.
CONCLUSION
The representations of law and lawyers, and science and
scientists, in lawyer movies are complex and diverse. Even when
legal scholars say that lawyers are generally portrayed
negatively in film, there are numerous positive images, such that
one can only speak of "the majority of lawyer movies." Similarly,
while the images of experts in lawyer movies are predominantly
positive, there are numerous negative portrayals. Even so, the
negative portrayals, as well as the representations of science as a
modest, human enterprise in cinema about law, do not seem to
condemn science and scientists as dangerous, arrogant, or
amoral, as did much (but again, not all) early science fiction
cinema. Just as the popular perception of scientists represented
in cinema about science is nowadays quite positive, the portrayal
of science and scientists in lawyer movies is correspondingly
positive. At the intersection of law-and-literature studies and
science-and-literature studies, the stock of science and scientists
is rising, even as law and lawyers remain in trouble. While this
phenomenon is likely to benefit the scientific enterprise, in terms
of attracting funding and promoting science careers, the
idealization of science in popular culture has even more adverse
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consequences in the legal context-i.e., beyond the comparative
loss of reputations on the part of law and lawyers. Judges and
jurors who do not recognize the limitations on the cultural
authority of science may alternatively accept the unreliable
testimony of experts who claim certainty, and reject the reliable
testimony of experts who concede their uncertainties.
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